one establishes by mixing one's labor with something else. Robert Nozick illustrates this problem with a clever hypothetical. Suppose I pour a can of tomato juice into the ocean: do I now own the seas? 5 A number of thinkers more or less contemporary to Locke proposed another theory of the basis of ownership. According to this theory, the original owner got title through the consent of the rest of humanity (who were, taken together, the first recipients from God, the genuine original owner).' Locke himself identified the problems with this theory; they involve what modern law-and-economics writers would call "administrative costs." How does everyone get together to consent to the division of things among individuals? 7 The common law has a third approach, which shares some characteristics with the labor and consent theories but is distinct enough to warrant a different label. For the common law, possession or "occupancy" is the origin of property." This notion runs through a number of fascinating old cases with which teachers of 5 ROBERT NoZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 175 (1974) . The example rests on the argument that Locke's labor theory of property means that one acquires property by mixing what one owns (one's labor) with what one does not own. Nozick substitutes the can of tomato juice for one's labor.
See, e.g., HuGo GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE bk. 2, ch. 2, 1, 4-5 (Kelsey trans. 1925) (1st ed. Amsterdam 1646); J. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 327-28, editor's note to lines 18-21; see also id. at 114, editor's introduction. For Blackstone's brief discussion of the conflicts among natural law theorists over labor and consent theories, see 2 WILLIAM BLACK-STONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *8 ("A dispute that savours too much of nice and scholastic refinement!"). 7 See J. LocKE, supra note 2, § 28, at 330 ("If such a consent as that [of all humanity for individual gathering of wild acorns or apples] was necessary, Man had starved, notwithstanding the Plenty God had given him."); see also id. § 29, at 331 (requiring explicit consent would result in prohibitive costs of allocating "to everyone his particular part"). Robert Filmer, against whose work Locke directed his Treatises, had also noted this problem. See the edition of Filmer's Patriarcha in JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 249-308 (T. Cook ed. 1947) . A possible answer is that consent takes the passive or negative form of acquiescence: humanity might be viewed as consenting to those individual claims to which no one objects. See SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, LE DROIT DE LA NATURE ET DES GENS liv. 4, ch. 4, § 9 (J. Barbeyrac trans. 5th ed. 1734) (1st ed. Lund 1672). It is possible to read Locke's property theory in this light, and indeed such a reading might resolve the contradiction between his stated views that (1) God gave the world to all mankind in common, but (2) all mankind need not consent to individual appropriation. J. LocKE, supra note 2, § 25, at 327; cf. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *8 (interpreting Locke as disputing the implied as well as the express consent theory). 8 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *8. Richard Epstein notes some ways in which the doctrine of first possession differs from a labor theory. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 1225-26. He also distinguishes the possession doctrine from a theory of property based on custom and common practice. Id. at 1234-35. My view is that a custom theory is a version of the theory of universal consent.
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HeinOnline --52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 74 1985 property law love to challenge their students. Such inquiries into the acquisition of title to wild animals and abandoned treasure may seem purely academic; how often, after all, do we expect to get into disputes about the ownership of wild pigs or long-buried pieces of eight? These cases are not entirely silly, though. People still do find treasure-laden vessels,' and statesmen do have to consider whether someone's acts might support a claim to own the moon, for example, or the mineral nodes at the bottom of the sea. 10 Moreover, analogies to the capture of wild animals show up time and again when courts have to deal on a nonstatutory basis with some "fugitive" resource that is being reduced to property for the first time, such as oil, 1 gas, groundwater, 1 3 or space on the spectrum of radio frequencies. 4 With these more serious claims in mind, then, I turn to the maxim of the common law: first possession is the root of title. Merely to state the proposition is to raise two critical questions: what counts as possession, and why is it the basis for a claim to title? 15 In exploring the quaint old cases' answers to these ques-' See, e.g (1904) . This rule may in fact not differ greatly from a rule of capture or first possession, since an owner cannot complain of loss of his water if it "escapes" to and is "captured" by a neighbor. Other states treat property in percolating groundwater under an "American" doctrine that limits the rights to "capture" subsurface water to such "reasonable use" as is compatible with the reasonable use of other owners. 15 Professor Epstein discusses the doctrine of possession from a perspective rather different from that presented here; he views the question of what counts as "possession" as the "little question," and concentrates instead on the "big question," viz., why possession counts as a basis of title at all. Epstein, supra note 4, at 1225. Without going into the big/little issue, my view is that one cannot meaningfully ask why possession is a root of title unless tions, we hit on some fundamental views about the nature and purposes of a property regime.
Consider Pierson v. Post,1 a classic wild-animal case from the early nineteenth century. Post was hunting a fox one day on an abandoned beach and almost had the beast in his gunsight when an interloper appeared, killed the fox, and ran off with the carcass. The indignant Post sued the interloper for the value of the fox on the theory that his pursuit of the fox had established his property right to it.
The court disagreed. It cited a long list of learned authorities to the effect that "occupancy" or "possession" went to the one who killed the animal, or who at least wounded it mortally or caught it in a net. These acts brought the animal within the "certain control" that gives rise to possession and hence a claim to ownership. 17 Possession thus means a clear act, whereby all the world understands that the pursuer has "an unequivocal intention of appropriating the animal to his individual use."' 8 A clear rule of this sort should be applied, said the court, because it prevents confusion and quarreling among hunters (and coincidentally makes the judges' task easier when hunters do get into quarrels).
The dissenting judge commented that the best way to handle this matter would be to leave it to a panel of sportsmen, 9 who presumably would have ruled against the interloper. In any event, he noted that the majority's rule would discourage the useful activity of fox hunting: who would bother to go to all the trouble of keeping dogs and chasing foxes if the reward were up for grabs to any "saucy intruder"? 20 If we really want to see that foxes don't overrun the countryside, we will allocate a property right-and thus the ultimate reward-to the hunter at an earlier moment, so that he will undertake the useful investment in keeping hounds and the useful labor in flushing the fox.
The problem with assigning "possession" prior to the kill is, of course, that we need a principle to tell us when to assign it. Shall we assign it when the hunt begins? When the hunter assembles his one has some idea of what is meant by "possession." Epstein does, I believe, have an unstated idea of what is meant by possession; the purpose of the present article is to make such ideas more explicit.
" Pierson thus presents two great principles, seemingly at odds, for defining possession: (1) notice to the world through a clear act, and (2) reward to useful labor. The latter principle, of course, suggests a labor theory of property. The owner gets the prize when he "mixes in his labor" by hunting. On the other hand, the former principle suggests at least a weak form of the consent theory: the community requires clear acts so that it has the opportunity to dispute claims, but may be thought to acquiesce in individual ownership where the claim is clear and no objection is made. 2 On closer examination, however, the two positions do not seem so far apart. In Pierson, each side acknowledged the importance of the other's principle. Although the majority decided in favor of a clear rule, it tacitly conceded the value of rewarding useful labor. Its rule for possession would in fact reward the original hunter most of the time, unless we suppose that the woods are thick with "saucy intruders." On the other side, the dissenting judge also wanted some definiteness in the rule of possession. He was simply insisting that the acts that sufficed to give notice should be prescribed by the relevant community, namely hunters or "sportsmen." Perhaps, then, there is some way to reconcile the clear-act and reward-to-labor principles.
The clear-act principle suggests that the common law defines acts of possession as some kind of statement. As Blackstone said, the acts must be a declaration of one's intent to appropriate." This possibility is illustrated in a later nineteenth-century case involving possession of land. Brumagim v. Bradshaw 24 involved two claimants to a considerable amount of land that had become, by the time the litigation was brought, the residential and commercial Potrero district of San Francisco. Each party claimed ownership of the land through a title extending back to an original "possessor" of the land, and the issue was whether the first of these purported possessors, one George Treat, had really "possessed" the land at 21 For a similar problem concerning ownership of oil and gas, having to do with uncertainties about the point at which to attribute "possession" to one who claims a fugitive resource, compare Hammonds v. Central Ky. Natural Gas Co., 255 Ky. 685, 689, 75 S.W.2d 204, 206 (1934) (gas withdrawn from earth and then pumped back for storage is comparable to animal returned to wild and may thus be tapped by a neighbor), with Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 250, 18 A. 724, 725 (1889) (oil and gas in the ground are "possessed" if all equipment is in place to tap at any time). 22 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 22 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *9, *258.
2' 39 Cal. 24 (1870).
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HeinOnline --52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 77 1985 all. If he had not, his successors in interest could not claim ownership through him, and title would go to those claiming through a later "first possessor." Those who claimed through Treat put a number of facts before the jury to establish his original possession. They noted particularly that Treat had repaired a fence across the neck of the Potrero peninsula-to which the other side rejoined that outsiders could still land in boats, and that, in any event, there was a gap in the fence. 25 The Treat claimants also alleged that Treat had made use of the land by pasturing livestock on it-though the other side argued that the land had not been suitable for cattle even then, because San Francisco was expanding in that direction. 2 8 The court ruled that the jury should decide whether Treat's acts gave sufficient notice to the public that he had appropriated the property. 2 7 If so, he had "possessed" it and could pass it on as an owner.
This instruction would seem to come down clearly on the side of the "clear act" theory of possession. Yet that theory seems to leave out some elements of the evidence. The fence question, to be sure, bore on whether Treat's acts informed the public of his claim. But the parties' arguments over whether Treat's use was "suitable" seemed to reflect concern over an aim of rewarding useful labor. If suitable use were a relevant issue, why did the court's jury instruction ignore the value of rewarding labor?
The answer to this question may well be that suitable use is also a form of notice. If outsiders would think that a large area near a growing city was abandoned because it was vacant except for a few cows, they might enter on the land and claim some prime waterfront footage for themselves. In other words, if the use that Treat made was unsuitable, his use would not give notice of his claim to others. Thus, to ask whether Treat used the land suitably is just another way of asking whether he informed others of his claim, particularly those others who might have been interested in buying the land from Treat or settling it for themselves. Society is worst off in a world of vague claims; if no one knows whether he can safely use the land, or from whom he should buy it if it is already claimed, the land may end up being used by too many people or by none at all.
Possession now begins to look even more like something that requires a kind of communication, and the original claim to the 25 Id. at 30. 26 Id. at 41-42. 27 Id. at 51.
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HeinOnline --52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 78 1985 property looks like a kind of speech, with the audience composed of all others who might be interested in claiming the object in question. Moreover, some venerable statutory law obligates the acquiring party to keep on speaking, lest he lose his title by "adverse possession."
Adverse possession is a common law interpretation of statutes of limitation for actions to recover real property. 2 8 Suppose I own a lot in the mountains, and some stranger to me, without my permission, builds a house on it, clears the woods, and farms the lot continuously for a given period, say twenty years. During that time, I am entitled to go to court to force him off the lot. But if I have not done so at the end of twenty years, or some other period fixed by statute, not only can I not sue him for recovery of what was my land, but the law recognizes him as the title owner. 2 9 The doctrine of adverse possession thus operates to transfer property to one who is initially a trespasser if the trespasser's presence is open to everyone, lasts continuously for a given period of time, and if the title owner takes no action to get rid of him during that time.
Here again we seem to have an example of a reward to the useful laborer at the expense of the sluggard. But the doctrine is susceptible to another interpretation as well; it might be designed, not to reward the useful laborer, but to require the owner to assert her right publicly. It requires her to make it clear that she, and not the trespasser, is the person to deal with if anyone should wish to buy the property or use some portion of it.
Courts have devoted much attention to the elements of a successful claim of adverse possession. Is grazing livestock a continuous use, so as to entitle the livestock owner to claim full ownership of the pasture as an adverse possessor? 30 How about farming (where intensive use may be merely seasonal) or taking care of a lawn? 31 Is a cave that encroaches deep under my land something that is obvious to me, so that I should be required to kick out the trespasser who operates it as a commercial attraction? how much the doctrine of adverse possession seems to reward the one who performs useful labor on land at the expense of the lazy owner who does nothing, the crucial element in all these situations is, once again, communication. "Possession" means acts that "'apprise the community [,] . . arrest attention, and put others claiming title upon inquiry. '-"8 In Illinois, for example, an adverse possessor may establish his claim merely by paying taxes on the property, at least against an owner who is familiar with real estate practice and records. 3 4 Why is this? Naturally the community likes to have taxes paid and is favorably disposed toward one who pays them. But more important, payment of taxes is a matter of public record, and the owner whose taxes are paid by someone else should be aware that something peculiar is happening. 5 Just as important, the public is very likely to view the taxpayer as the owner. If someone is paying taxes on my vacant lot or empty house, any third person who wants to buy the house is very likely to think that the taxpayer is the owner because people do not ordinarily pay taxes on land they do not own. If I want to keep my land, the burden is upon me to correct the misimpression. The possibility of transferring titles through adverse possession once again serves to ensure that members of the public can rely upon their own reasonable perceptions, and an owner who fails to correct misleading appearances may find his title lost to one who speaks loudly and clearly, though erroneously. . 244, 244 (1969) . This was designed to protect the railroads, who could not police their vast holdings and needed notice through the assessors' offices. Id. at 248-49. Such a rule again suggests the communicative aspect of adverse possession: claims ought not run against those who are incapable of "hearing" the message given by the would-be adverse possessor. The same may be said of the classes of owners, mentioned infra note 35, whose properties are normally treated as immune from adverse possession claims.
35 An owner who is unlikely to notice such an oddity may be exempt from adverse possession claims. These claims normally do not run against mental incompetents or children or certain other "disabled" owners who might be thought unable to perceive or act on events that would constitute notice to ordinary adults. See, e.g Possession as the basis of property ownership, then, seems to amount to something like yelling loudly enough to all who may be interested. The first to say, "This is mine," in a way that the public understands, gets the prize, and the law will help him keep it against someone else who says, "No, it is mine." But if the original communicator dallies too long and allows the public to believe the interloper, he will find that the interloper has stepped into his shoes and has become the owner.
Similar ideas of the importance of communication, or as it is more commonly called, "notice," are implicit in our recording statutes and in a variety of other devices that force a property claimant to make a public record of her claims on pain of losing them altogether."' Indeed, notice plays a part in the most mundane property-like claims to things that the law does not even recognize as capable of being reduced to ownership. "Would you please save my place?" one says to one's neighbor in the movie line, in order to ensure that others in line know that one is coming back and not relinquishing one's claim. 37 In my home town of Chicago, one may choose to shovel the snow from a parking place on the street, but in order to establish a claim to it one must put a chair or some other object in the cleared space. 8 The useful act of shoveling snow does not speak as unambiguously as the presence of an object that blocks entry.
Why, then, is it so important that property owners make and keep their communications clear? Economists have an answer: clear titles facilitate trade and minimize resource-wasting conflict. If I am careless about who comes on to a corner of my property, I invite others to make mistakes and to waste their labor on improvements to what I have allowed them to think is theirs. I thus invite a free-for-all over my ambiguously held claims, and I encourage contention, insecurity, and litigation-all of which waste 36 For a recording statute that recognizes only those real-property claims that have been recorded, see 45 (1967) . 37 For notice elements in claims to places in line, see On the Pressures and Politics of Waiting in Line, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1982, at C1, C7, col. 1 (claims staked by "saving places" and leaving objects; one entrepreneur distributes numbered tickets for places in the standing-room line at the opera). 38 See Chicago Tribune, Jan. 27, 1985, § 2, at 1, col. 1 (picture of chairs placed in shoveled parking spaces). everyone's time and energy and may result in overuse or underuse of resources. But if I keep my property claims clear, others will know that they should deal with me directly if they want to use my property. We can bargain rather than fight; through trade, all items will come to rest in the hands of those who value them most. If property lines are clear, then, anyone who can make better use of my property than I can will buy or rent it from me and turn the property to his better use. In short, we will all be richer when property claims are unequivocal, because that unequivocal status enables property to be traded and used at its highest value. 9 Thus, it turns out that the common law of first possession, in rewarding the one who communicates a claim, does reward useful labor; the useful labor is the very act of speaking clearly and distinctly about one's claims to property. Naturally, this must be in a language that is understood, and the acts of "possession" that communicate a claim will vary according to the audience. Thus, returning to Pierson v. Post, the dissenting judge may well have thought that fox hunters were the only relevant audience for a claim to the fox; they are the only ones who have regular contact with the subject matter. By the same token, the mid-nineteenthcentury California courts gave much deference to the mining-camp customs in adjudicating various Gold Rush claims; the Forty-Niners themselves, as those most closely involved with the subject, could best communicate and interpret the signs of property claims and would be particularly well served by a stable system of symbols that would enable them to avoid disputes. 4°T he point, then, is that "acts of possession" are, in the now fashionable term, a "text," and that the common law rewards the author of that text. But, as students of hermeneutics know, the 
HeinOnline --52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 82 1985 clearest text may have ambiguous subtexts. 4 1 In connection with the text of first possession, there are several subtexts that are especially worthy of note. One is the implication that the text will be "read" by the relevant audience at the appropriate time. It is not always easy to establish a symbolic structure in which the text of first possession can be "published" at such a time as to be useful to anyone. Once again, Pierson v. Post illustrates the problem that occurs when a clear sign (killing the fox) comes only relatively late in the game, after the relevant parties may have already expended overlapping efforts and embroiled themselves in a dispute. Very similar problems occurred in the whaling industry in the nineteenth century: the courts expended a considerable amount of mental energy in finding signs of "possession" that were comprehensible to whalers from their own customs and that at the same time came early enough in the chase to allow the parties to avoid wasted efforts and the ensuing mutual recriminations. 42 Some objects of property claims do seem inherently incapable of clear demarcation-ideas, for example. 4 3 In order to establish ownership of such disembodied items we find it necessary to translate the property claims into sets of secondary symbols that our culture understands. In patent and copyright law, for example, one establishes an entitlement to the expression of an idea by translating it into a written document and going through a registration process-though the unending litigation over ownership of these expressions, and over which expressions can even be subject to patent or copyright, might lead us to conclude that these particular secondary symbolic systems do not always yield widely understood "markings. ' 44 We also make up secondary symbols for physical ob- 44 For an extreme example of the failure of the copyright system to give clear notice of ownership of songs, see Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), in which the court, in an opinion by Judge Frank, held that the author of "The Lord Is My Shepherd" was entitled to a trial on the merits of whether Cole Porter's "Begin the Beguine" infringed his copyright! Cf. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984) (computer operating system software may be copyrighted). In the case of computer software, it has been suggested that the invention might better have been handled as a patent, except that the lead time for patents is so long jects that would seem to be much easier to mark out than ideas; even property claims in land, that most tangible of things, are now at their most authoritative in the form of written records. 45 It is expensive to establish and maintain these elaborate structures of secondary symbols, as indeed it may be expensive to establish a structure of primary symbols of possession. The economists have once again performed a useful service in pointing out that there are costs entailed in establishing any property system. 46 These costs might prevent the development of any system at all for some objects, where our need for secure investment and trade is not as great as the cost of creating the necessary symbols of possession.
There is a second and perhaps even more important subtext to the "text" of first possession: the tacit supposition that there is such a thing as a "clear act," unequivocally proclaiming to the universe one's appropriation-that there are in fact unequivocal acts of possession, which any relevant audience will naturally and easily interpret as property claims. Literary theorists have recently written a great deal about the relativity of texts. They have written too much for us to accept uncritically the idea that a "text" about property has a natural meaning independent of some audience constituting an "interpretive community" 47 or independent of a range of other "texts" and cultural artifacts that together form a symbolic system in which a given text must be read. 48 It is not that it would make the "property" right useless in such a rapidly changing field-hence the choice of the more rapid copyright system. See Sanger, The Gavel Comes Down on Computer Copycats, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1983, § 3, at 8, col. 1. The Apple Computer analysis further suggests that secondary systems for establishing rights in "uncatchable" property may not be immune from the disputes and overlapping use that often accompany unclear property claims. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text. ECON. 163, 168-78 (1975) (property-rights systems for Western land, livestock, and water were developed only when the benefits of such systems overcame the administrative costs of establishing them); Umbeck, supra note 40, at 421-28 (choice of property system subject to constraint of transaction costs); see also Michelman, supra note 39, at 30-31 (private property is a type of regulatory system).
" ' enough, then, for the property claimant to say simply, "It's mine" through some act or gesture; in order for the "statement" to have any force, some relevant world must understand the claim it makes and take that claim seriously. Thus, in defining the acts of possession that make up a claim to property, the law not only rewards the author of the "text"; it also puts an imprimatur on a particular symbolic system and on the audience that uses this system. Audiences that do not understand or accept the symbols are out of luck. For Pierson's dissenting judge, who would have made the definition of first possession depend on a decision of hunters, the rule of first possession would have put the force of law behind the mores of a particular subgroup. The majority's "clear act" rule undoubtedly referred to a wider audience and a more widely shared set of symbols. But even under the majority's rule, the definition of first possession depended on a particular audience and its chosen symbolic context; some audiences win, others lose.
In the history of American territorial expansion, a pointed example of the choice among audiences made by the common law occurred when one group did not play the approved language game and refused to get into the business of publishing or reading the accepted texts about property. The result was one of the most arresting decisions of the early American republic: Johnson v. McIntosh, 4 9 a John Marshall opinion concerning the validity of opposing claims to land in what is now a large part of Illinois and Indiana. The plaintiffs in this case claimed through Indian tribes, on the basis of deeds made out in the 1770's; the defendants claimed under titles that came from the United States50 The Court found for the defendants, holding that the claims through the Indians were invalid, for reasons derived largely from international law rather than from the law of first possession. But tucked away in the case was a first-possession argument that Marshall passed over. The Indians, according to an argument of the claimants from the United States, could not have passed title to the opposing side's predecessors because, "[b]y the law of nature," the Indians themselves had never done acts on the land sufficient to establish property in it. That is to say, the Indians had never" really undertaken texts). 41 those acts of possession that give rise to a property right. 1 Although Marshall based his decision on other grounds, 52 there was indeed something to the argument from the point of view of the common law of first possession. Insofar as the Indian tribes moved from place to place, they left few traces to indicate that they claimed the land (if indeed they did make such claims). 5 3 From an eighteenth-century political economist's point of view, the results were horrifying. What seemed to be the absence of distinct claims to land among the Indians merely invited disputes, which in turn meant constant disruption of productive activity and dissipation of energy in warfare. Uncertainty as to claims also meant that no one would make any productive use of the land because there is little incentive to plant when there is no reasonable assurance that one will be in possession of the land at harvest time. 4 From this classical economic perspective, the Indians' alleged indifference to well-defined property lines in land was part and parcel of what seemed to be their relatively unproductive use of the earth. 55 possession, quite to the contrary, reflects the attitude that human beings are outsiders to nature. It gives the earth and its creatures over to those who mark them so clearly as to transform them, so that no one else will mistake them for unsubdued nature. 6 0
We may admire nature and enjoy wildness, but those sentiments find little resonance in the doctrine of first possession. Its texts are those of cultivation, manufacture, and development. We cannot have our fish both loose and fast, as Melville might have sdid, 61 and the common law of first possession makes a choice. The common law gives preference to those who convince the world that they have caught the fish and hold it fast. This may be a reward to useful labor, but it is more precisely the articulation of a specific vocabulary within a structure of symbols approved and understood by a commercial people. It is this commonly understood and shared set of symbols that gives significance and form to what might seem the quintessentially individualistic act: the claim that one has, by "possession," separated for oneself property from the great commons of unowned things. . This chapter describes some litigation over ownership of a whale that had been harpooned but got away, harpoon and all, only to be harpooned and taken by a second crew. The legal question involved the point at which the whale stopped being a "loose-fish" and became a "fast-fish"-that is, the point at which the whale became someone's property. Melville goes on to describe a number of items (including serfs and mortgages) as "fast-fish" and a number of other items (America at Columbus' arrival, ideas, the rights of man) as "loose-fish."
